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FEIST OR FAMINE - AMERICAN
DATABASE COPYRIGHT AS AN
ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE
EUROPEAN UNION
I. INTRODUCTION
The copyright laws of the United States and the European
Union have become key forces in the international competition
for market share in one of the most dynamic sectors of the
world economy. The United States and the European Union
have embarked on divergent regimes for the copyright protec-
tion of computer databases. The aim of European Union law is
to protect local database developers by granting them owner-
ship of the data collected in their compilations.' In contradis-
tinction, the aim of United States law is to maximize market
efficiency by protecting only creative selection and arrange-
ment of data and leaving the underlying facts free for the tak-
ing.2
At the center of the division between the two regimes is a
basic provision of United States copyright law; the "thin" pro-
tection granted to the facts in a data compilation.' The protec-
tion is "thin" because the compiler of a database can only gain
copyright for the creative way in which he has organized the
data he collected; he does not, however, gain any protection for
the effort, or "sweat of the brow," he has invested in the collec-
tion. No matter how many thousands of hours or millions of
1. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
COM(92)24 final § 3.2.8, at 25 [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
2. Yale Brownstein, Economics of Property Rights as Applied to Computer
Software and Databases (a study commissioned by the Congressional Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyright (CONTU)), in 4 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS
AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD 1-21 (Nicholas Henry ed., 1980).
3. A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre-
existing materials or of data that are selected, coordinated or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.
The term "compilation" includes collective works. 17 U.S.C.S. § 101 (1978). The
copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contrib-
uted by the author of such work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. "The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
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dollars are spent gathering data, traditional copyright law
grants only a "thin" copyright in the creative organization and
always leaves the facts collected free to be used by someone
else.
The United States copyright approach to data compilations
adheres to the creative selection approach. The Copyright Act
of 1976 was interpreted definitively in the context of data com-
pilations by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.4 In an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that alphabetical
listings in a telephone book did not contain the minimum level
of creativity required for copyright. The Feist Court explicitly
rejected the "sweat of the brow" proposition that the creator of
a data compilation such as a telephone book should be econom-
ically rewarded for his effort regardless of the creativity it
exhibits.5
In contrast, the European Union has abandoned the
fact/expression distinction for data compilations. In order to
spur domestic development of computer databases, the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine is at the heart of the Commission of the
European Communities' Proposal for a Council Directive on the
Legal Protection of Databases (Proposed Directive).6 Unlike
Feist, which covers all compilations, the Proposed Directive is
specifically targeted to computer databases. The Proposed
Directive contains a two-tiered approach to database copy-
right.! The first tier grants a copyright in creative selection
and 'arrangement, which is largely consistent with existing
international copyright law as embodied in the Berne Conven-
tion,8 and consequently with United States law as articulated
in Feist.9 The second tier, however, is a sui generis provision
which prohibits unfair extraction or copying of the facts in an
4. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
5. Id. at 351-55.
6. Proposed Directive, supra note 1. (Prior to the ratification of the
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the European Union was known as the European Com-
munities. Titles of documents prior to 1993 bear the previous name.).
7. Id. at 34.
8. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1986, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221,
excerpts reprinted in ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES app. at
135 (1992).
9. Feist, 499 U.S. at 340.
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otherwise unprotected work." While the Commission asserts
that such an approach does not extend a copyright to facts,"
in actuality it has the effect of granting to the original compil-
er a limited "ownership" of the facts.
The drafters of the Proposed Directive appear to be inter-
ested in increasing the European share of a market central to
the economic development plans of most industrialized nations.
Intellectual property from movies to microchips is the engine
driving United States foreign trade at the expense of many of
her staunchest competitors. In 1990, the United States enjoyed
a $12.6 billion trade surplus in copyright and patent license
transactions; it was the only G-7" nation to run a surplus."
In the same year, worldwide revenue in online databases was
just over $9 billion.'4 Though just a small segment of the larg-
er intellectual property market, the database industry is
among the fastest growing." While European database devel-
opers produced almost half the world total of databases, they
accounted for only one quarter of the total revenue. This is be-
cause nonprofit producers (governments) still produce the ma-
jority (fifty-four percent) of European databases, whereas
American databases are produced largely by the private sector
(seventy-two percent). 6
10. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, §§ 5.3.6, 5.3.7., at 35.
11. Id.
12. The G-7 is the group of the world's seven richest industrial nations. The
G-7 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
13. Policing Thoughts, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1992, at 55, 56.
14. Brief of the Information Industry Association and ADAPSO, the Computer
Services Industry Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 21 n.17, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(No.89-1909) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK (1990))
[hereinafter Amicus Briefl.
15. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 3.
16. Id., § 2.1.6, at 7. The Information Technology Association of America (for-
merly ADAPSO) included the following nonexhaustive list of examples of private
sector data compilations in its amicus curiae brief in Feist:
Financial Information Databases. The stock quotation "IBM 108 3/8 1
1/8" may not be protectible by copyright. But the collection and assembly
of this and many other similar statements, and their arrangement in any
of a wide variety of ways, can satisfy the criteria for protection as a
compilation. Examples range from the familiar stock tables or earnings
reports in the financial pages of the daily newspaper to customized data
subsets based on the industry sector, geography, enterprise size or other
factors. Financial databases, whether historical "snapshots" of corporate
7311994]
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This Note will argue that the European Union's approach
to database protection is anticompetitive and inefficient. While
it may help European database developers in the short term by
shielding them from competition, the European Union's treat-
ment will slow the growth of a vital industry in the long term.
In contrast, this Note will demonstrate that the American
scheme ensures a more efficient market for data, allowing
faster growth in a less regulated market. Part II of this Note
will place copyright law in an economic context. Part III will
survey the copyright protection afforded data compilations in
the United States and the European Union. Part IV will trace
the development cycle of a computer database and apply the
legal principles of the respective regimes to each stage of the
cycle. Within the framework of the development life cycle, this
Note will argue that United States copyright law as it relates
to data compilations is the optimum policy alternative for
growth of an efficient market. By contrast, it will become clear
financial performance or systems that reflect current trading, are today
indispensable tools for investors, regulators and participants in all finan-
cial markets.
Credit Reporting Systems. Each business day, hundreds of thousands of
business decisions are made on whether to grant credit to an individual
or company seeking it. The factual basis for these determinations is
drawn from copyrightable compilations of credit data. The data them-
selves-factual statements concerning credit history--often are not indi-
vidually eligible for copyright protection.
Demographic Databases. In these compilations, uncopyrightable data
items on defined categories of people are collected and arranged in a
variety of ways. The data consist of factual statements about subjects
ranging from buying habits to neighborhood traffic patterns, from proper-
ty tax records to stated political affiliations. The resulting databases play
a dominant role in marketing, fundraising, and planning decisions of
incalculable significance.
Bibliographic Databases. Researchers and students worldwide rely upon
compilations ranging from traditional card catalogs to computerized sys-
tems of references to medical, scientific or legal literature (for example,
SHEPARD's citations). While some of these databases include expository
summaries or abstracts of the contents of the works indexed, even those
limited to catalog number, author, title, publisher and similar factual
information are protectible as compilations.
Economic and Industrial Databases. These compilations assemble and
present statistical data on housing and construction, trade, manufactur-
ing, agriculture, natural resources, health transportation, and other
quantifiable aspects of economic and social activity. These databases un-
derpin momentous decisions made every day at all levels of business and
government.
Amicus Brief, supra note 14 at 8-9.
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that the European Union's Proposed Directive is geared toward
the profit interests of local database compilers at the expense
of global macroeconomic gain.
This Note will not discuss copyright theory's usual concern
with the moral (or natural) rights of the author to own what
he has produced. Both regimes are principally concerned with
the proper level of economic protection for both the supplier
and the consumer of databases. The United States, though
recognizing moral rights in some contexts, has effectively elim-
inated these concerns from the discussion of compilations in
both case and statutory law. Similarly, while many of the Eu-
ropean Union member states recognize moral rights, because
such rights are thought not to distort competition between
states, the supranational laws of the Union in this context are
silent on the subject.1
Additionally, this note will not address the debate over
whether copyright is the proper protection for databases at all.
A vocal chorus of critics argues that copyright is not the appro-
priate regime for the protection of computer databases. 8
These critics believe that the analogy between data compila-
tions and databases is strained at best. The problem is that
any protection granted to a database by virtue of its organiza-
tion would simply be too difficult to disentangle from the pro-
tection granted to the underlying computer program. Although
this argument is compelling in many respects, both the United
States and the European Union have, for the foreseeable fu-
ture, settled on copyright as the protection for both databases
and data compilations.
II. COPYRIGHT IN AN ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Copyright is a property right rooted in the ancient recogni-
tion that the free market, if left unregulated, would not suffi-
ciently compensate the creative expression of new ideas. Copy-
right is one of the earliest statutory rights to receive wide-
spread acceptance. 9 The market does not reward expression
17. Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology, COM(88)172
final § 1.4.9, at 7 [hereinafter Green Paper].
18. For a survey of this argument, see Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact
of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992).
19. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne ch. 19 (Eng.), was the first statute to
specifically recognize the rights of authors and is the statutory basis for all legis-
19941
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absent copyright because once a work is printed or otherwise
disseminated, the author enjoys no physical control over it. A
work can be copied and reproduced such that the author not
only loses control over the actual words he has written or pic-
ture he has painted, but also over any profit which might be
earned from a purchase of copies of the work.2" This makes
private investment in the authoring and production of a work
a very unattractive business absent some legal protection.21
In a desire to reward the author, and hence encourage
production of new works, copyright essentially grants the au-
thor a monopoly over the reproduction and dissemination of his
creative expression for a limited period of time.2 Thus, copy-
right is also a tax to society, because the author may set any
price he chooses for the work, though the work faces potential
substitution if the price is too high and buyers opt instead for
other, similar works. Competitors are prohibited from copying
expressions without the author's consent. To produce new
works, competitors must pay to license, or they must start
from scratchy Hence the public may be burdened by higher
prices or limited access to the copyrighted work.' 4 Copyright
thus establishes a tax on readers, publishers, and competitors
for the purpose of rewarding writers." In order to protect the
copyright holder while mitigating the burden of his monopoly
on his competitors and customers, the protection is limited to
creative expression for a specific period of time. In contrast, if
the purpose of copyright were solely to reward the author,
copyright would be absolute in duration and scope. The limit is
important because the purpose of copyright is not solely to
reward the author, but rather to induce production at the min-
lation on copyright both in the United States and abroad. ALAN LATMAN ET AL.,
COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 1 (Robert A. Gorman & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 3d
ed. 1989) (citing JAMES RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956)).
20. Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection
Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343,
1364 (1991).
21. Id. at 1367.
22. Brownstein, supra note 2, at 9.
23. See Yen, supra note 20, at 1365.
24. Id.
25. According to one early commentator, "the tax is an exceedingly bad one; it
is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures."
LATMAN ET AL. supra note 19, at 16 (quoting 1841 speech in House of Commons
by Macauley, in 8 WORKS 201 (Trevelyan ed., 1879)).
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imum possible cost to society.26 The law, by limiting the own-
ership of data, thus favors its free movement and therefore
contributes to the general progress of society.
In contrast, the policy behind the sui generis protection in
the European Union's Proposed Directive is intended to maxi-
mize profit in information services for European providers of
information services. This policy choice is not rooted solely
in economics; European law also recognizes a moral right to
intellectual property which is absent in United States law.28
Fundamentally, however, the Proposed Directive is intended to
favor European database publishers at the expense of their
customers and non-EU competitors.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR DATABASES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION
A. United States Law
United States copyright law, as it relates to data compila-
tions, can be divided broadly into the period before and the
period after the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications
v. Rural Telephone Service Co.3" Prior to Feist, circuit courts
were split as to whether creative selection and arrangement of
facts were the only protectible elements of a compilation, or
whether the author's effort in compiling the data should be
considered, and protection granted based on the "sweat of the
26. See Yen, supra note 20, at 1365.
27. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 2.
28. Briefly, the moral right theory of copyright is rooted in the economic phi-
losophy of John Locke, who wrote that a person should own a work simply by
virtue of the fact that he or she created it. While American law has embraced this
concept in certain cases, it is not the law as expressed in Feist. See Wendy J.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); see also Alfred C.
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 517 (1990).
While moral rights were considered an important general consideration in
the drafting of the Proposed Directive, the authors of the EU law reasoned that as
all member states are adherents to the Berne Convention "a certain fundamental
convergence of their law had already been achieved." More specifically, "differences
in national approaches to the authors' moral rights ... do not in general produce
situations which need to be addressed by the Community." Green Paper, supra
note 17, § 1.4.9, at 7.
29. Green Paper, supra note 17, § 1.3.3, at 4.
30. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
1994] 735
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brow." Feist resolved the circuit split by coming down emphati-
cally on the side of a strict creativity requirement. This re-
quirement represented a fairly dramatic narrowing of the
scope of protection for data compilations and computer data-
bases.3
Although Feist represents a decisive consolidation of Unit-
ed States law on the topic, it must be considered in light of
several other elements. First, in order to understand the tone
and intent of the Feist court, one must consider the constitu-
tional roots of the creativity requirement and the concerns of
the Framers. Second, the nature of the circuit split leading to
Feist dictated much of the decision's language. Third, the 1976
Copyright Act contains statutory provisions which clarified a
number of areas and substantially strengthened the argument
for the creativity -requirement. Fourth, the contours of the
creativity requirement as articulated in Feist must be exam-
ined. Finally, two cases are offered to illustrate how Feist is
interpreted by lower courts. One case recently decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Bellsouth Advertis-
ing Co. v. Donnelly,2 offers great insight into the difficulties
faced in applying copyright law to databases, simultaneously
showing that the creativity requirement is an appropriate and
durable analysis when applied to emerging information tech-
nology. A second case, Key Publications v. Chinatown Today,33
is illustrative of circumstances found to satisfy the narrow
creative selection and arrangement standard articulated in
Feist.
1. The Roots of the Creativity Requirement
The basis of the creativity requirement for copyright pro-
tection lies in the United States Constitution.34 The argument
that creativity and originality are inherent in the notion of
authorship stems from the Copyright Clause.35 Because the
31. See generally Raskind, supra note 18.
32. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
33. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
34. "The Congress shall have Power . . .To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authoigs and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
35. The Copyright Act of 1976 states:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
736 [Vol. XX:3
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Constitution grants Congress the power to provide copyright
protection only to authors, only creative expression is protect-
ed.36 This limit also ensures that facts are not copyrightable.
Two cases from the late nineteenth century stand as the
foundation of the creativity requirement in modern United
States law: The Trade-Mark Cases3 7 and Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony.31 In The Trade-Mark Cases the Su-
preme Court determined that for a work to be termed a writ-
ing entitled to protection, "originality is required."39 The
Court stated that:
while the word "writings" may be liberally construed, as it
has been, to include original designs for engraving, prints,
&c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in the
creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.40
Similarly, the Burrow-Giles Court emphasized the indispens-
able importance of creativity to copyright. The Supreme Court
wrote that copyright protection should only be afforded to the
"original intellectual conceptions of the author."4' The Court
challenged authors alleging infringement to prove the "exis-
tence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of
thought, and conception ....
More recent courts have amplified the creativity require-
ment and its role in United States copyright law. The decisions
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following cate-
gories: (1) literary works ....
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
Furthermore, "Itihe subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in
which such material has been used unlawfully." 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
36. MELvILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMIER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.03(A) (1994).
37. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
38. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
39. 100 U.S. at 94.
40. Id.
41. 111 U.S. at 58.
42. Id. at 59-60.
1994] 737
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pay particular attention to the balance that must be estab-
lished between ensuring the author's incentive to produce and
the sufficiently free flow of information in order to promote the
advancement of useful knowledge. For example, in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,4 3 the Court reiter-
ated the proposition that copyright is a limited grant intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors on one hand, while
ensuring the free flow of ideas on the other.44
2. The Split in the Federal Circuits Prior to Feist
Although the modern creativity requirement has a strong
pedigree in United States copyright jurisprudence, it has not
always been the consensus position. On the contrary, all but
two circuits long held that, for reasons of basic moral equity
and encouragement of author production, the effort of an au-
thor or compiler should be considered in the copyright analysis.
The division began in the Second Circuit in 1922 when the
court of appeals asserted that the compiler of a directory of
trademarks should be rewarded for his industrious collec-
tion.45 Advancing what was essentially a moral rights argu-
ment,4 the court held in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v.
Keystone Publishing Co. that the directory merited copyright
protection and that a competing directory copied from the orig-
inal compilation was an infringement."
Fifteen years later, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ratio-
nale of Jeweler's Circular in Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Tele-
graph Co.4" Although the allegedly infringing telephone direc-
tory inverted the organization of plaintiff's San Francisco Bay
Area telephone directory by organizing listings by phone num-
43. 464 U.S. 417 (1989).
44. Id. at 429.
45. Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83
(2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
46. The court stated:
The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the
names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupation and their street
number, acquires material of which he is the author. He produces by his
labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, and
thus obtain the exclusive right of multiplying copies of his work.
Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
47. Id.' at 83.
48. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
[Vol. XX:3738
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ber instead of name, it was held to infringe plaintiffs copy-
right. The court held that a valid copyright could be granted
based on the original compiler's labor and investment.49 After
these two cases, many federal courts entertained the "sweat of
the brow" theory. Most of these "sweat" holdings do not stray
far from the basic premise that hard work, no matter how
routine, should be rewarded."
While the circuit courts remained divided until Feist, as an
indication of the growing movement against the "sweat" doc-
trine both the Second and Ninth Circuits later changed their
minds and reversed earlier "sweat" holdings. The Second Cir-
cuit, since Jeweler's Circular, has continued to reject the
"sweat" theory as too restrictive of the public's access to infor-
mation. In an illustrative case, Financial Information Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.,5" the court held that to "grant
copyright protection based merely on the 'sweat of the author's
brow' would risk putting large areas of factual research materi-
al off limits and threaten the public's unrestrained access to
information."52 The Ninth Circuit, which had encouraged ac-
ceptance of the "sweat" doctrine in Leon, helped speed the
doctrine's demise in Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co.53 In
Worth, the court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Leon, stat-
ing that "to the extent Leon suggests that research or labor is
protectible, later cases have rejected that theory."
54
While the Supreme Court formally healed the circuit split,
a number of factors beyond the Second and Ninth Circuit re-
versals had already begun to work in that direction. Principal-
ly, the interesting and intellectually far-ranging work of the
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Work
49. Id. at 487.
50. See, e.g., Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Everyone must do the same basic work, the same 'industrious collection.' A
subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself what the first compil-
er has done."), vacated, 499 U.S. 944 (1991); see also Hutchinson Tel. Co. v.
Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist
Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987), affd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Among the most comprehensive treatments of
the "sweat" doctrine is National Business Lists v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F.
Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
51. 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
52. Id. at 207.
53. 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988).
54. Id. at 573.
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(CONTU) led to many of the amendments of the Copyright Act
of 1976. The Act itself reaffirmed the role of the creativity
requirement, paving the way for Feist.
3. CONTU and the Copyright Act of 1976
In enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress sought to
narrow the philosophical debate among the federal circuits
that led to the split, and make the creativity requirement even
more explicit.5 Congress deleted the 1909 Copyright Act's
reference to "all the writings of an author,"56 and replaced it
with "original works of authorship."57 Congress stressed that
it was simply clarifying an existing requirement.58 The 1976
Act also specifically defined compilations as literary works that
merited copyright protection if sufficiently original in selection
and arrangement. 9
It is important to note that the creativity requirement is
not simply an untested relic of an era before computers. As
part of the debate over the 1976 Act, Congress established the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright-
ed Works (CONTU) to examine the copyright issues raised by
computer and photocopier technologies. In preparation for the
drafting of the 1976 Act, CONTU commissioned a series of
ground-breaking studies into the fundamental economics of
copyright as it relates to computer technologies. Many of these
studies represented the first, and today still some of the most
important, inquiries into pricing models for information, infor-
mation customer behavior analyses and other cornerstone
economic paradigms of the information market.0
The process of developing and presenting these economic
studies was far from a sleepy academic conference. The process
has been characterized as a "political brawl involving the redis-
55. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 102, at 51 (1976), reprinted
in 17 U.S.C.S. app. § 102, at 669 (1994).
56. Id.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
58. "The phrase 'original works of authorship,' which is purposely left unde-
fined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality estab-
lished by the courts under the present [1909] copyright statute." 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1988).
59. 17 U.S.C., § 101 (1978).
60. See generally 3-5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIc
RECORD, supra note 2.
740 [Vol. XX:3
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tribution of political and economic power between haves and
have-nots."61 The brawl was between copyright "owners" and
"users" and centered on who would control information as new
technologies, such as photocopying and computers, made the
man in the street a potential publisher.62 The struggle has
been cast in Marxian language, with the "exploited masses" of
copyright users casting off their chains and becoming a "bour-
geoisie" of small publishers."3 Nevertheless, overly vivid lan-
guage aside, CONTU was charged with deciding how the 1976
Act would fix the balance of power in copyright during the age
of computers.
Although mediating fairly between the competing inter-
ests, CONTU kept the user firmly in mind. In examining data-
bases, and finding them suitable for copyright protection,'
CONTU defended the creativity requirement as the best way
to mitigate the monopoly position of large original compilers.
Consequently, the CONTU Final Report found, after examin-
ing other schemes, that copyright principles were flexible
enough to provide effective regulation for databases without
any sui generis protection.65
4. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.66
a. The Facts of Feist
Rural Telephone Service Co. and Feist Publications, Inc.
were competing publishers of yellow page directories. Rural
Telephone Service Company, a certified public utility providing
telephone service to several communities in northwest Kansas,
was required by state law to issue an annual telephone direc-
tory. Rural published a typical directory consisting of white
pages and yellow pages. The white pages listed residential
customers in alphabetical order, and the yellow pages listed
61. Id. Introduction, at x.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. "Under the new law, a data base is a compilation and thus a proper sub-
ject for copyright." 5 COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RE-
CORD, supra note 2 at 77 [hereinafter CONTU Final Report].
65. Arthur Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV.
977, 981 (1993).
66. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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business subscribers alphabetically by category and featured
classified advertisements. 7 Feist Publications also published
wide area telephone directories, but covered a much larger
geographical area than normal white pages. These directories
reduced the need to consult directory assistance or consult
multiple listings.68 Both companies' directories were distribut-
ed free of charge. The two companies competed fiercely for ad-
vertising revenue."
The Feist directory in dispute covered eleven telephone
service areas in fifteen counties. Of the eleven local telephone
companies, only Rural refused to license its listings to Feist.
Rural's refusal created a problem for Feist, as omitting the
listings would have created a gap in its coverage of the region
and would have made the directory less attractive to advertis-
ing customers. Unable to license Rural's listings, Feist used
them without consent.7 °
Rural sued for copyright infringement in the District Court
for the District of Kansas, claiming that Feist could not use the
data contained in Rural's directories to compile competing
directories.7' Feist countered that it would be economically
impractical for its employees to go door-to-door to collect the
information themselves. They further argued that such an
effort was, in any event, unnecessary because the copied infor-
mation was beyond copyright protection.72
The district court granted summary judgment to Rural,
stating that "courts have consistently held that telephone di-
rectories are copyrightable."73 The court of appeals affirmed74
and the Supreme Court reversed.7"
67. Id. at 342.
68. Id. at 343.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 344.
72. Id.
73. 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987). The court cited a string of lower
court decisions.
74. 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990).
75. 499 U.S. at 340.
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b. The Contours of the Creativity Requirement in Feist
In Feist,othe Supreme Court addressed the copyrightability
of an alphabetical telephone listing.76 The Court held that the
sine qua non of copyright is originality and that while the level
of creativity required for a work to warrant copyright protec-
tion is extremely low," an alphabetical listing of telephone
subscribers did not meet that standard.7" The Court noted
that Rural Telephone's "selection, coordination and arrange-
ment" of its White Pages were "entirely typical."79 The White
Pages were thus found to lack the creativity required to "trans-
form mere selection into copyrightable expression."0
The Feist Court reminded those federal circuits which
recognized sheer industry as a basis for copyright "that as facts
do not owe their origin to an act of authorship,"8' they were
not copyrightable. However, the Court recognized that a
properly assembled group of them might be copyrightable:
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: the
first person to find and report a particular fact has not creat-
ed the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To
borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its
maker or originator. The discoverer merely finds and re-
cords."
76. Id. at 343-44.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 362.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. At least one commentator has suggested that Feist is significantly flawed
by the Court's failure to distinguish between authorship and originality. Professor
Leo Raskind argues that by merging the two concepts: "[T]he Court leaves the
readers of the opinion to speculate whether the ultimate inquiry is in the work
produced or in the activity of producing it or some of each." Raskind, supra note
18, at 334.
It is curious that Professor Raskind should be troubled that the answer is
.some of each." The nature of the fact or expression distinction dictates that there
will always be a gray area around the extent to which selection of data is a form
of creative expression, as it involves knowledge, judgement and skill. The Feist
Court said simply that the creativity of the selection will be a component of the
"authorship" quality of the final product. But no matter how deftly selected, the
discrete facts themselves gain no protection. While this will certainly create the
need to make often subtle distinctions between selection that is and is not suffi-
ciently "original," these types of distinctions are inescapable in any area of copy-
right law.
82. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
83. Id. (citation omitted)
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Thus, the Court accepted that some compilations would con-
tain the requisite creativity to qualify for protection.8 ' In fact,
even a directory that contains no protectable creative expres-
sion could be copyrighted if it featured "original selection or
arrangement."'
The aspect of Feist most alarming to database developers
is the two natural conclusions drawn by the Court from its
discussion of the creativity requirement. First is the recogni-
tion that the fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean
that all the components of the work are protected. Instead,
only the creative aspects are shielded from copying; the facts
are free to anyone who wants them." Second is the inescap-
able conclusion that even where a factual compilation does
qualify for copyright, the protection afforded the work is
thin; 7 the secondary compiler remains free to use the under-
lying data as long as he arranges it differently."
Though alarming to database developers, the creativity
requirement was meant, historically, to be a comfort to readers
and users. The grant of a property interest in creative expres-
sion was seen as a way to reinforce the ferment of free speech.
Consistent with the political philosophers of the day, the
Framers viewed ownership of property, be it real or intellectu-
al, as the strongest guarantee of a free citizenry.89 The Feist
court objected to "sweat of the brow" protection; a subsequent
compiler would be forced to find all of the data independently
only to arrive at the same result." This type of protection,
according to the Court, promoted precisely the type of wasted
effort that the "proscription against the copyright of ideas and
facts is designed to prevent."
9'
While recognizing the policy concerns underlying the cre-
ativity requirement as articulated by Jefferson and more mod-





89. David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC'y 421 (1983), reprinted in ALAN LATMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 19-
20.
90. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-49.
91. Id. at 354 (quoting Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967)).
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ern commentators, the Feist court was principally interested in
adhering to the statutory provisions requiring creativity as set
out in the 1976 Act. The Court, in defining a copyrightable
"compilation" in a manner consistent with section 101 of the
Act,92 described three criteria for copyrightability of a compi-
lation: "(1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material,
facts or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or arrangement of
those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the particu-
lar selection, coordination or arrangement of an 'original' work
of authorship."" Based on these criteria, the Court concluded
that some fact-based works would not be sufficiently original to
meet the creativity standard. 4 In short, Feist re-established
the importance of the creativity requirement and created a
workable link in copyright law between the policy concerns of
the Framers and the economic concerns of computer database
developers.
5. Applying Feist: The Third Time is the Charm
Bellsouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. (BAPCO) v.
Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc.9" demonstrates the
major difficulty in applying Feist. In three decisions centering
on the standard of creativity required for the protection of the
selection and arrangement of computer databases, the
Bellsouth courts struggled over what exactly is copyrightable
material.96 The three decisions, one in the Southern District
92. The 1976 Act defines a compilation in the context of copyrightability as a
"work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work
as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C.S. § 101 (1978);
see also supra note 3.
93. Feist, 499 U.S. at 357.
94. Id. at 358.
95. 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991),
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 999 F.2d
1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
96. Some commentators had suggested that the Bellsouth court was in fact
clinging to a "sweat" doctrine post Feist. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copy-
right and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 352 (1992). While this is a difficult position to substanti-
ate, as the court repeatedly stressed that it found Bellsouth's arrangement to have
been sufficiently creative, it in fact appeared to be the case. See Bellsouth, 933
F.2d at 958. The fact that a finding of creativity is subjective often means the
court can apply a "sweat" recognition of the developer's labor and ignore the cre-
ativity requirement.
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of Florida and two in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, articulate the major difficulty in applying Feist: cre-
ativity is in the eye of the beholder. The cases also show, how-
ever, that Feist is an effective doctrine for the protection of
databases.
Bellsouth was the publisher of the Greater Miami Yellow
Pages directories. Donnelley sought to license the data in the
Bellsouth Yellow Pages in order to produce a competing direc-
tory. When Bellsouth supplied the data under license, as it had
to fifty-seven other competing publishers, Donnelley had it
keyed into a computer database, along with the headings and
categories developed by Bellsouth, in order to create not only a
new directory, but also a sales contact sheet used to compete
with Bellsouth's advertising space salespeople.97
In a motion for summary judgment before the district
court, Bellsouth alleged copyright infringement and unfair
competition as to the unlicensed sales lead sheets, among other
causes of action. In its cross motion for summary judgment
and opposition to Bellsouth's motion, Donnelley conceded that
Bellsouth had a valid claim in the selection and arrangement
of its data, but claimed that no copyright existed in the names
and addresses that it had copied. 8 Donnelley also
countersued, complaining that Bellsouth had violated the
Sherman Act by effectively limiting competition for business
directories in the Miami area.99
Oddly, the district court declined to state whether it was
applying a "sweat of the brow" or creativity standard to the
facts of the case. Instead, the court stated that while it pre-
ferred the selection and arrangement test, it was not clear
which test the Eleventh Circuit had adopted in previous deci-
sions.' 0 The court continued: "It is clear however, that
BAPCO's directory meets both tests."'01 Applying this some-
what muddled legal doctrine, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Bellsouth, holding that in creating the unli-
censed sales leads, Donnelley had not simply copied the unpro-
tected data, but had also reproduced "a format nearly identical
97. Bellsouth Corp., 719 F. Supp. at 1553-54.
98. Id. at 1554-55.
99. Id.




to that used by BAPCO."l'0 It is not exactly clear how the
court would have ruled had it applied a clear selection and ar-
rangement analysis, and the decision often jumbles exactly
what type of protection the court is granting and to what facet
of the directory.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Feist by just a
few months, the court of appeals clearly applied the selection
and arrangement standard in the first appeal." 3 Examining
the creativity of the selection and arrangement of BAPCO's
directory, the court found that BAPCO's selection of geographic
boundaries for its directory, its use of a close date after which
entries could not be changed prior to publication, and its cre-
ation of business classifications rendered the directory a
unique arrangement of data.10 4 The court then correctly ap-
plied Feist, holding that while the directory merited protection
for the originality of its arrangement, "only the original format
[was] protected, the bare information itself segregated from the
compilational format [was] not protected."105
The Eleventh Circuit then turned its attention to whether
Donnelley had appropriated enough of BAPCO's format to
constitute illegal copying. The court found that Donnelley had
appropriated the "essence of BAPCO's compilation."06 The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding of summa-
ry judgement for BAPCO.
While correctly applying Feist to Bellsouth, the decision
did not end the life of the controversy in the Eleventh Circuit.
Just over a year after it was decided, the Eleventh Circuit
vacated the decision and agreed to rehear the case.0 7 Sitting
en banc, the court of appeals held that the acts of selection and
arrangement, specified in the earlier appellate decision as
meriting protection for originality, were in fact insufficiently
creative to warrant such protection.0 8 Because Donnelley
conceded the validity of BAPCO's copyright at the trial court,
102. Id. at 1559.
103. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing,
Inc., 933 F.2d at 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
104. Id. at 957-58.
105. Id. at 958.
106. Id. at 959.
107. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing,
Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1992).
108. Id. at 1442.
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the court of appeals decided whether Donnelley appropriated
BAPCO's original selection, rather than whether the selection
merited copyright protection in the first place.109 The result-
ing analysis was identical: the selection and arrangement were
insufficiently creative.
The court found that while yellow pages classifications
were somewhat more elaborate than those rejected for protec-
tion in Feist, originality had to be resolved through comparison
with other yellow pages. The court held that the classifications
were no more than a "convention."110 The court made an ana-
logy to a Second Circuit case where the plaintiff had "exercised
neither selectivity in what [it] report[ed] nor creativity in how
[it] report[ed] it.""' Furthermore, the court held that
BAPCO's claim of copyright did not survive application of the
merger doctrine."' Under the merger doctrine, "expression is
not protected in those instances where there is only one or so
few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expres-
sion would effectively accord protection of the idea itself."'
Because BAPCO's arrangement was the only way to organize a
business directory, the organization had "merged" with the
idea of a business directory, and thus was uncopyrightable."4
Taken collectively, the three Bellsouth decisions add signif-
,icant detail to the rough topography of the creativity require-
ment sketched by the Supreme Court in Feist. The district
court decision represents the confusion surrounding the appro-
priate doctrine prior to Feist. The first appellate decision dem-
onstrates the way sympathy for the effort expended by the
compiler will lead some courts to find creativity in anything.
The second appellate decision exemplifies proper application of
Feist's creative selection rule. When compared with other simi-
lar works, the BAPCO directory simply did not stand out. It
had no creative value-add that warranted government protec-
tion.
While Bellsouth illustrates the difficulties in applying
Feist, another case demonstrates the type of selection that is in
109. Id. at 1440-42.
110. Id. at 1442 n.13.
111. Id. at 1442 (quoting Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d
671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991)).
112. Id.




fact protected, and illustrates the fact that any assessment of
creativity boils down to a highly subjective factual analysis and
comparison to public domain materials. In Key Publications v.
Chinatown Today,"' the Second Circuit considered whether a
combined directory of white and yellow pages for New York
City's Chinese-American community exhibited sufficient cre-
ativity in the selection and arrangement of its listings to war-
rant copyright protection."6 The Key Publications court held
that because the publisher of the Key Directory excluded busi-
nesses that she did not think would stay in business very long,
"such as certain insurance brokers, take-out restaurants and
traditional Chinese medical practitioners,""7 the selection in-
dicated "thought and creativity.""8 Based on this analysis,
the court found that the directory's selection and arrangement
were copyrightable.
Taken together, Feist and its progeny require only a mini-
mum standard of creativity. Many data compilations, however,
will not be sufficiently creative to qualify. There is no escaping
the conclusion that millions of dollars may be spent to create a
work which will enjoy either no copyright protection, or at
best, only thin protection. Although this treatment seems
harsh, it is the most economically efficient legal regime. Yet
the attempt to resolve this apparent inequity is at the heart of
the European Union's Proposed Directive.
B. The European Community's'19 Proposed Directive on the
Legal Protection of Databases
The European Community's Proposed Directive for the
Legal Protection of Databases embodies the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine. It lags behind the United States in database
development because the Union took this position.2 ° The
strength of the Directive's approach is that it grants a property




119. The European Community changed its name to the European Union in
1993. For the purpose of clarity, this Note uses "Community" in the title of the
Proposed Directive, as this is how it appears in the actual title. "Union" is used
in all other references.
120. See Proposed Directive, supra note 1.
1994] 749
BROOK. J. INTL L.
interest to an author for the work he expended. Unlike the
convolutions of Feist, the "sweat" doctrine is relatively straight-
forward as a legal principle. More interesting is its genesis in
international law-both in the context of the Berne Convention
and its legislative history within the Commission of the Euro-
pean Union.
1. The Proposed Directive in the Context of EU Law
and the Berne Convention
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome [EEC Treaty].2 established
the European Economic Community. Now the European Union,
the group includes the following twelve member states: Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.
The Union has its own institutions which make law pursu-
ant to the Treaty of Rome. The Commission of the European
Union, the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice of
the European Union hand down decisions and judgments in
particular cases. The Commission proposes and the Council of
Ministers issues directives to which the member states must
conform their respective national laws. Union law as a whole,
including the Treaty of Rome, case law and directives, controls
how the intellectual property laws of each of the member
states are to take effect in a wide range of cases.'22
In cases of conflict with national law-common in the area
of intellectual property' 2 -- EU law takes precedence. The
Court of Justice established this principle in Costa v. Enel.'24
The holding was based on the court's interpretation of the
second paragraph of article 5 of the Treaty of Rome which
specifies that member states shall "abstain from any measure
which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty."'25 Thus EU law can have direct effect, without fur-
ther legislative acts by the member states, not only on acts of
121. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COAIiUNITY [EEC TREATY]
art. 1.
122. See generally 1 PAUL GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 1, at EEC-3 (1992).
123. Id. § 1(2)(a), at EEC-6.
124. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964 C.M.L.R. 425.
125. EEC TREATY art. 5.
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the member states themselves, but on the rights and obliga-
tions of individual citizens under the states' respective national
laws.126 Although the direct effect of EU law on individuals is
subject to some further analysis, intellectual property laws
have generally been found to have this direct effect.127
In addition to the national courts of the member states,
and the Court of Justice, the Commission of the European
Union is empowered to investigate and make decisions con-
cerning complaints under articles 85 and 86 which deal with
distortion of competition and abuse of market position.'28
Thus, the Commission is typically involved where the com-
plaint involves a member state's failure to conform its national
laws to EU law.
Consequently, when it became effective on January 1,
1993, the Proposed Directive on the Legal Protection of Data-
bases immediately superseded any member state's national
law in existence at the time. Regardless of earlier strategies for
database protection, the provisions of the Proposed Directive
were passed into national law either actively by the national
legislatures or passively through their adherence to the Treaty
of Rome.
The Proposed Directive was enacted with the provisions of
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works 2 9 in mind."' The Berne Convention, which is ad-
ministered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, is
the principal multilateral codification of standards for the
international protection of intellectual property. The effect of
the Berne Convention on the laws of its adherents differ some-
what from country to country. For example, in the United
Kingdom, which does not consider its treaty agreements to be
126. See Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 585, 1964 C.M.L.R. at 425.
127. GELLER, supra note 122, § 1, at EEC-7.
128. EEC TREATY arts. 85-86.
129. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra
note 8.
130. Id. The initial Berne Act dates back to 1886 and was either partially or
fully revised by the Berlin Act of 1908, the Rome Act of 1928, the Brussels Act of
1948 and the Stockholm Act of 1967. The Stockholm Act was ratified and its pro-
visions put into effect by the Paris Act of 1971. While most EU member states
are long time adherents to the Berne Convention, the United States did not ac-
cede until March 1, 1989. This was due largely to an unwillingness by Congress
to alter the United States' unique copyright duration scheme. Geller, supra note
122, § 3, at INT-62-63.
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self-executing, the grounds for copyright protection will be
found wholly under national law. The applicable Berne Act
serves only as an aid for construing national law. 1' It is im-
portant to remember that because most EU intellectual proper-
ty law has direct effect on the national law" of the member
states, it will typically supersede the provisions of the Berne
Convention.
Additionally, the specific provisions to which each Berne
Convention member adheres also varies from country to coun-
try, creating a byzantine network of international legal obliga-
tions. For example, France joined the Berne Act of 1886 and
then adhered to all subsequent acts. Romania, on the other
hand, joined the Convention under the Berlin Act, and now
adheres to the provisions of the Rome Act. Needless to say,
this system can lead to a relatively complex process of deciding
what obligations are owed to fellow Berne adherents.
The administration of article 2(5) of the Convention, which
mimics section 103(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 by granting
protection to compilation, is made somewhat easier by the fact
that it was ratified by the Paris Act of 1971, the most recent
round of revision. Specifically, article 2(5) provides:
Collections of literary or artistic works such as
encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selec-
tion and arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual
creations shall be protected as such, without prejudice to the
copyright in each of the works forming part of such collec-
tions.
132
Thus, article 2(5) grants protection to collections of artistic and
literary works where the selection and arrangement is suffi-
ciently creative.
The Berne Convention did not, however, contemplate pro-
tection for electronic databases, and no specific protection is
outlined. In the first tier of its two-tiered approach, the Pro-
posed Directive seeks to fill this void by making explicit the
protection of database compilations exhibiting sufficient cre-
ativity in selection and arrangement. The Proposed Directive
must thus be seen not only in light of its express provisions,
131. GELLER, supra note 122, § 3(b)(i), at INT-62.1 n.284.
132. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra
note 8, art. 2(5), reprinted in ALAN LATMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 136.
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but also in light of the international legislative context in
which it was conceived. The supranational nature of the Union
created the impetus for a common approach to databases
where national laws differed on the issue. Similarly, the re-
quirements for protection set by the Proposed Directive are
largely reactions to the perceived strengths and weaknesses of
the Berne Convention's creativity requirements for compila-
tions.
2. The Evolution of the Proposed Directive
Debate on the Proposed Directive evolved over a period of
several years. The debate centered on a single familiar issue
with respect to compilations: how to protect the author's eco-
nomic interest at the lowest cost to society. Two preliminary
documents framed the debate: an initial Green Paper on Copy-
right and the Challenge of Technology,3 ' which generally ex-
plored the issues in the copyright protection of databases; and
finally, a Follow-Up to the Green Paper,34 which was adapt-
ed into the text of the Proposed Directive.
The fundamental concerns of the Union member states as
expressed in the Green Paper were fourfold. The first was to
eliminate internal differences in member state law in order to
create a single database market unsegmented by varied copy-
right regimes.' The second was to develop policies "at least
as favourable to [European developers] as that enjoyed by their
principal competitors in their home markets" in order to im-
prove the competitiveness of the European economy.3 6 The
third was that intellectual property should enjoy a "fair return
when exploited in non-Member States." 7 Finally, the au-
thors recognized that in some areas "copyright protection with-
out suitable limits can in practice amount to a genuine monop-
oly, unduly broad in scope and lengthy in duration."3 8 As a
result, the authors concluded that the interests of third-party
competitors and the public at large must be considered in the
133. Green Paper, supra note 17.
134. Follow Up to the Green Paper on the Challenge of Technology,
COM(90)584 final [hereinafter Follow Up to the Green Paper].
135. Green Paper, supra note 17, § 1.3.2, at 3-4.
136. Id. at § 1.3.3, at 4.
137. Id. at § 1.3.4, at 4.
138. Id. at § 1.3.5, at 5.
1994] 753
BROOK. J. INTL L.
formulation of any additional copyright protections.139
With these general provisions firmly in mind, the authors
of the Green Paper considered whether some protection should
be afforded to data compilations which contained
uncopyrightable data.40 The Paper acknowledged that the
Commission was considering measures to protect the data
within a compilation, because the buying and selling of data
within databases was a growth industry.' Eschewing any
moral rights justification, the Paper states that such action
would only be taken if it "were felt that the considerable in-
vestment which the compilation of a data base represents
could best be served by copyright protection rather than by
other means."'
In its Opinion on the Green Paper (Opinion),' the
Commission's Section for the Industry, Commerce, Crafts and
Services advised caution on the issue of sui generis protec-
tion.' However, the Opinion notes only that there is still a
great deal of disagreement on the proper form of protection
without offering any affirmative suggestions.'45
Based on the reservations of the Opinion, the Commission
held a hearing for interested parties to discuss the idea of sui
generis protection for databases.'46 At the hearing, no sup-
port was expressed for sui generis protection." Instead, most
participants expressed the opinion that a criterion of originali-
ty compatible with the Berne Convention was the best ap-
proach.48
Given the concerns of the Commission on the dangers of
monopoly, the cautious approach of the Opinion, and the re-
sults of the hearing generally opposing added protection, the
adoption of the second tier of protection in the Proposed Di-
rective is somewhat mysterious. The most likely explanation is
concerted lobbying by large database compilers, such as the
139. Id. at § 1.3.6, at 6.
140. Id. at §§ 6.4.4-6.4.6, at 212-13.
141. Id. at § 6.4.7, at 213.
142. Id. at § 6.6.2, at 215.
143. Opinion on the Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technolo-
gy, 1989 O.J. (C 71) 9.
144. Green paper, supra note 14, at 13-14.
145. Id.
146. Follow Up to the Green Paper, supra note 134, § 6.2.1, at 18.
147. Id.
148. Id. at § 6.2.2 (13), at 20.
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national telephone monopolies, seeking to protect their own
interests.
3. The Provisions of the Proposed Directive
The Commission of the European Communities' Proposed
Directive'49 is divided into two tiers. The first tier requires
creative selection and arrangement in order to merit protection
for compilations in a manner consistent with United States
law and the Berne Convention. The second tier, however, de-
parts from international convention and United States law by
creating sui generis protection for the data contained in a com-
pilation.
The first tier of protection established by the Proposed
Directive is a benign effort to harmonize copyright protection
for database compilations in a manner consistent with the
protection granted by article 2(5) of the Berne Convention to
literary or artistic collections. 5 ' The first tier grants protec-
tion to compilations exhibiting sufficient creativity in selection
and arrangement. Thus, the first tier simply consolidates the
law of the European Union around a standard to which the
great majority of member states and the United States already
adhere, 5' and explicitly extends this protection to computer
databases.
In contrast to the harmonizing effect of the first tier of the
directive, the second tier represents something of a departure
from the approach of the vast majority of Berne Convention
signatories by creating an ownership right in the underlying
data. This ownership right allows the database developer to
prevent the unauthorized extraction or re-use of the contents of
a database for commercial purposes.'52 The developer thus
owns the data he has compiled, regardless of the eligibility of
149. The Proposed Directive came into effect on January 1, 1993 and is binding
on all member states. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, art. 13, at 74.
150. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, §§ 2.2.8, at 15; 2.2.9, at 15; 3.1.2, at 19;
3.1.10, at 21.
151. In most instances, EU member states had made no provisions for database
protection in their national law. "There is relatively little case law even in the
Member States with the most developed database industry. Isolated cases in the
jurisprudence of other Member States are inconclusive as to the scope of protec-
tion." Id. at § 2.2.9, at 15.
152. Id. at art. 2(5), at 67.
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the database for protection under the first tier.5 '
In order to mitigate the monopolistic effects of the owner-
ship right, the Proposed Directive also requires that the origi-
nal compiler issue licenses to secondary compilers." This
compulsory license is imposed when the database has been
made publicly available and is the only source of a work or
material.'55
Although the Directive codifies a compulsory licensing
scheme for data compilations for the first time, compulsory
licensing has been ordered by the Commission and the Court of
First Instance in other areas where compulsory licensing is
required to fulfill the goals of Article 86 of the Treaty of
Rome.'56 Article 86 provides a proscription against monopolis-
tic activities and has been invoked to force compilers with a
"dominant position" to license material to secondary compilers.
One of the most notable decisions concerning compulsory
licensing, and one roughly analogous to the compilation scenar-
io, concerned the licensing of television listings contained in
T.V. guides. Both the Commission and the Court of First In-
stance57 required that publishers holding copyrights in week-
ly listings of television programs license the rights to publish
such listings to secondary compilers also seeking to publish
153. Id.
154. Id. at § 8.1, at 50.
155. Id.
156. Article 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall
be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market in so far as
it may affect trade within the Member States. Such abuse may, in
particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or
selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
Cb) limiting production, markets or technical development
to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transac-
tions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competi-
tive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to accep-
tance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection to
the subject of such contracts.
EEC TREATY, art. 86 (1957).
157. Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission, [1991] II E.C.R.
485, 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance 1991).
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guides.5 ' All of the orginal guide publishers were television
companies operating in the United Kingdom and Ireland.'59
Parties wishing to publish weekly T.V. guides were "economi-
cally dependent" on these companies as suppliers.16 More-
over, the data was useless once published on Sunday, and it
was impossible for the secondary compiler to produce compre-
hensive guides from daily newspaper listings.
Both the Commission and the Court held that they enjoyed
dominant positions which gave rise to a monopoly over the
market for television listings. 6' The Court found that the ef-
fect of exercising copyright in this case was to hinder all com-
petition in the market for weekly listings, and was, as a result,
violative of Article 86.162 The Commission required the three
organizations to supply others, on request, with advance pro-
gram listings and to license publications of these listings.6 3
Such licenses were to include a requirement to pay unspecified
reasonable royalties. The Court upheld such relief." The
Court also held that the provisions of the Berne Convention
recognizing exclusive rights to reproduce protected works were
superseded by the interests of the Union in maintaining the
freedom of competition established by the Treaty of Rome.'65
While the broad antitrust implications of this case are
unlikely to surface in cases concerning data compilations, the
case demonstrates the time and expense required to adminis-
ter compulsory licensing. Such appeals to the international
bureaucracy and courts are likely to become commonplace
under the Proposed Directive, increasing costs and decreasing
the general availability of inexpensive, timely data.
158. Id. at 121
159. Id.
160. Id.
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IV. COPYRIGHT As AN ECONOMIC POLICY LEVER IN THE
DATABASE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE: DIRECTING INVESTMENT
TOWARD INNOVATION AND ENSURING THE MARGINAL-COST
PRICING OF DATA
From cars to computers to guns, we now take it for grant-
ed that all manufactured goods are made from interchangeable
parts. A single supplier will sell commodity nuts, bolts and
brake shoes to automobile manufacturers. A host of personal
computer makers build their machines from the same chip.
British gunsmiths claimed 150 years ago that it was impossi-
ble to make something as precise as a gun from interchange-
able parts; highly skilled craftsmen were required to file each
component, at an enormous increase in cost. But Samuel Colt's
small company ultimately dominated the world market for
guns by eliminating the need for custom-developed parts.'66
The revolution took place in manufacturing because stan-
dard interchangeable parts could be produced by a number of
companies operating in a competitive market. From the parts
manufacturer's perspective, costs were reduced because a sin-
gle part could be sold to any number of finished product pro-
ducers. From the finished product producer's perspective, costs
came down because competitive bids could be solicited from a
range of parts manufacturers.
This environment was a sharp contrast from a market in
which the makers of customized parts could charge higher
prices based on their protected market position. Their protect-
ed positions resulted from the cost and time associated with
producing specialized parts for a single potential buyer. Com-
petitors were reluctant to enter a market where they would be
forced to start from scratch in order to service a single buyer
who already had an entrenched relationship with the original
developer of the part.
The same evolution from proprietary (produced by a single
producer to fit a single assembly) to interchangeable (produced
by multiple producers to fit mutliple assemblies) parts that
revolutionized the production of goods must continue to work
in the production of information. From legal databases to in-
dustrial specifications to names and addresses of telephone
166. See generally Paul Romer, The Concept of Production is Being Re-Tooled,
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993, at 70.
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subscribers to lists of registered trademarks, the market for
electronic information will grow most quickly if the underlying
data is free to subsequent compilers. 67 This will ensure a
competitive market by eliminating the protected market posi-
tions of original database compilers. Competition flourishes
when subsequent compilers are not forced to start their data-
base by going out and rediscovering the same data. Buyers
benefit as the price of databases lowers through competition.
The database market benefits as more databases are sold at a
lower price.
The kind of competitive market that will allow this evolu-
tion to continue is a market where the average long-term price
of a database is as close as possible to the database's marginal
cost. 6 ' The marginal cost of a good is the cost to the manu-
facturer (or author/publisher) of producing one additional
unit."'69 In a perfectly competitive market, all firms are too
small in relation to the overall market to affect price.17
Thus, equilibrium for a profit-maximizing firm occurs where
marginal cost equals the price set by the market. 7' In other
words, where the cost of producing one additional unit is equal
to the revenue earned from selling it. Market price does not
rise above marginal cost in a competitive environment because
no firm may charge more than another; any attempt by a sin-
gle firm to raise prices results in a loss of sales as buyers opt
for lower priced products. If the market price were to drop
below a producer's marginal cost, he would not gain enough
revenue from the sale of a unit to cover his expenses in produc-
ing it, and would ultimately be forced to drop out of the mar-
ket.
In contrast to this competitive market scenario, a copy-
right in underlying data will lead to a market more analogous
167. See generally JOHN I. GALBRA1TH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 10-18 (4th
ed. 1986).
168. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy-
right Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327-28 (1989).
169. To simplify the analysis, one must ignore the distinction between costs
incurred by the author and those incurred by the publisher. This simplification,
however, eliminates a number of important issues concerning the relationship be-
tween author and publisher. See id. at 327.
170. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, EcoNoMIcs: PRINCIPLE AND POLICY 64-69 (4th
ed. 1988), cited in John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 SW. L.J.
1139, 1171 n.189 (1990).
171. Id.
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to a monopoly. A monopoly is a market in which a seller may
dictate supply, and hence price, because no alternative seller is
available.'72 Buyers in these markets pay more than they
would in a competitive market, and thereby inefficiently trans-
fer resources to the monopolist.' In the context of databas-
es, this situation is analogous to the market for custom gun
parts in that once a compiler owns the data copyright, subse-
quent compilers will be reluctant to incur the costs of starting
from scratch and entering a market already dominated by the
original player. This leaves the orginal compiler in a protected
market position in which he can charge monopolistic prices
until a subsequent compiler can generate the same data from
scratch.
This is not to say that in a competitive market every
producer's price must always be equal to marginal cost. On
certain occasions, a producer may invent an innovative new
product with features that make it unique in the market at a
specific point in time. During this "monopoly window" where
the producer's product is unique, he may charge a price higher
than other competitors who are bound to the marginal cost
price. This higher price is not inefficient for two reasons. First,
the higher price reflects the greater value of the product; if the
product is not worth more, customers may opt to buy from
lower priced competitors. Second, the "monopoly" price charged
will only last for the limited period of time it takes for competi-
tors to match the innovation and for prices to return to a mar-
ginal cost level in expectation of the next innovation. The
pioneer's position is not protected by the copyright system; it is
protected by his own ingenuity and the speed with which he
brings a new product to market.
Given the efficiencies of a competitive market where long-
term average price approaches marginal cost, the question for
copyright policy makers is what form of protection should be
granted to ensure investment in innovation of information
products while allowing the commodity raw material, data, to
move quickly and at low cost among suppliers of databases and
between suppliers and customers. Assuming that the evolution
of the database industry is analogous to the evolution of manu-




facturing industries, the lower costs of innovative production
will increase competition and eliminate some competitors, the
market will grow exponentially as less expensive, better prod-
ucts continue to attract new populations of customers. In order
to evaluate the copyright options in light of these economic
assumptions, it is illustrative to trace a database through its
competitive life cycle," and to compare the effects of United
States and European law on the likely investment by the com-
piler and the resultant cost to the consumer at each juncture of
the product life cycle. The resulting analysis demonstrates that
while United States and European law would have similar
effects on database protection, in most respects the two ap-
proaches differ in one critical area: the United States approach
ensures that database developers are free to rely on an inex-
pensive and plentiful supply of data, while the European ap-
proach adds cost and promotes inefficiency.
A. Identification of New Markets
In a competitive environment, development of a copyright-
able database usually begins with the identification of a mar-
ket niche and potential customers. The compiler must assess
the potential users' needs, capabilities, and preferences, and
then locate and evaluate the sources of the facts that are to be
compiled.'75
United States and European Union law are identical in
their protection at this early stage. Producers who successfully
identify original categories of information that are useful to
users in a new market would enjoy two protected positions.
First, developers would enjoy a time-based monopoly for the
period of time that their product was the only one on the mar-
ket containing the new category. For example, a database
developer offering information to retailers on food-buying
trends of Latino customers in San Antonio could charge a pre-
mium price for the information as long as that developer was
the only source. The amount of the premium would depend
only on how well they had identified a market for the product.
Second, both United States law after Feist and European Un-
174. The stages of database development are taken from the Amicus Brief,
supra note 14, at 18-19.
175. Id. at 18.
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ion law under the first tier of the Proposed Directive would
recognize a copyright in that information product because it is
based on the creative selection of data and creates an original
category.'76 Copyright in creative selection and arrangement
spurs investment in new products, as producers enjoy limited
protection for their innovative category selection and organiza-
tion.
Investment in market identification and category selection,
not the ownership of data, is the proper source of advantage
for a database in a competitive market. In a competitive mar-
ket, developers of a novel format would gain copyright protec-
tion for that format, and set prices according to demand for
their ingenuity. They would be released temporarily from the
pressures of marginal cost pricing; as long as their product is
either the first one available in the market or more ingenious
than other available products, they can charge a premium
price. This typically brief monopoly window is not, however,
detrimental to the market because competitors may take the
data and compete based on another novel format. The welfare
of the market increases as consumers get better products
through competition and developers get more customers be-
cause of the better products they are forced to develop to stay
in business. Resources are not simply being transferred from
customers to monopolists who are not driven to innovate. Con-
sumers are paying higher prices because they perceive greater
value in the innovative product they are purchasing.
B. Assessments of Multiple Data Sources
After a market for the data has been identified and useful
categories of data developed, database developers must find
sources of data to deliver to their customers. Occasionally, the
required data may come from a single source. However, more
often than not the data will come from multiple sources whose
contents must be sampled and selected for usefulness in the
particular database. For example, a demographic database may
draw upon public sources, such as census data, property tax
records, and voter registration files, as well as a wide variety
of proprietary sources that contain data on the target group,
such as purchasing patterns, or subscriptions to catalogs and
176. See Proposed Directive, supra note 1, § 3.2.2, at 22.
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periodicals. Often, the effort of collecting the right data in-
volves extracting a needle of fact from a haystack of irrelevant
information.'
The cost-benefit analysis applied to the selection of data
will differ depending on the legal regime. Under United States
law, the cost-benefit analysis is relatively simple. Regardless of
the originality in the the selection and arrangement of the
sources, the underlying data in the work is free to anyone
provided they do not take the format. Thus, an American com-
piler of a new database would simply take the best quality
data and target it to his market, provided he was not in-
fringing upon the original compiler's creative selection and
arrangement.'78 Thus, the absence of copyright protection for
data under the United States regime maximizes the power of
market forces on databases that are already developed. Data is
free because its marginal cost is zero. Absent transmission
costs, it simply does not cost any more to deliver a completely
developed database to the tenth subscriber than it cost to de-
liver it to the ninth. Profit is properly stripped from the owner-
ship of underlying data.
Of course, while the data is free from copyright protection,
many other mechanisms are available to protect it from com-
petitors. Access to electronic information is, to a great extent,
governed by contract."'79 Software algorithms can make it dif-
ficult to access information without agreeing on how the infor-
mation will be disseminated and re-used. However, new distri-
bution methods, such as on-line information gateways (the
much ballyhooed Internet is a prime example) and easily por-
table compact disks containing vast compilations of material,
are expanding access to parties who may not be in contractual
privity with the database proprietors. These trends weaken
contractual controls but should not shake the basic logic be-
hind copyright protection limited to creative selection and
arrangement.8 '
In contrast to the United States approach, the Proposed
Directive's "neighboring rights" scheme grants certain protec-
tion to the basic data as well as providing for traditional copy-
177. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 18.
178. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Ser. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
179. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 21.
180. Id.
1994] 763
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
right for the creativity of the compilation.18' The original
compiler thus owns the facts he has compiled for a limited
statutory period. This arrangement skews pricing because the
artificial monopoly allows the original compiler to charge a
price above what he would charge in a competitive scenario
until another compiler develops the data from scratch.
The Proposed Directive purports to limit the inefficiencies
of this artificial monopoly by compelling the original compiler
to license his data to any developers of derivative compilations
if his work was the only source of the data in question.'82
Proponents of such a sui generis regime modified by license
point to its main advantage; it grants stronger protection to
database developers while limiting their monopoly power by
forcing the original compiler to make the work available to all
who need to use it." The license thus corrects the
underprotection of data resulting from the creativity re-
quirement by granting protection to the work of the initial
compiler."M It also prevents the overprotection of information
by giving access to secondary compilers." As Columbia Law
School Professor Jane Ginsburg points out: "compulsory licens-
ing is an appropriate means of reconciling the warring goals of
stimulating the production of information on the one hand, and
ensuring its dissemination on the other."'86 Thus compulsory
licensing embraces the "sweat of the brow" doctrine's recog-
nition of the original compiler's right to profit.
Moreover, the mandatory licensing scheme also preserves
the time-based advantage for original compilers by requiring
licensing only for works offered to the public, not for data com-
pilations still under development. 8 ' In the latter case, a com-
pulsory license would eliminate any time advantage the origi-
nal compiler might enjoy, and consequently, would erode the
production incentive that the licensing scheme is designed to
181. "Neighboring rights" is often used interchangeably with the term sui
generis to denote a type of protection unique to a certain category, in this case
databases.
182. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 50.
183. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protec-
tion of Works of Information, 90 COLUAM. L. REV. 1865, 1926 (1990).
184. Id. at 1927.
185. Id.
186. Id.




Even given its positive effect on database developers, the
compulsory licensing scheme suffers from all the weaknesses
inherent to government price regulation." Price regulations
are difficult to administer efficiently and, as a result, always
lag behind the rapid progression of market forces. Artificial
regulations also distort the beneficial effect of the law of sup-
ply and demand. Some producers would find the resulting pric-
es lower than what they would pay for the license on the open
market, thereby receiving a subsidy, while others would find
the price artificially high and stay out of production where
they might otherwise have entered.'89 In short, compulsory
licensing exhibits many of the same "bad tax" characteristics
as those exhibited in an absolute copyright monopoly. In addi-
tion, the potential for abuse of a compulsory licensing system
by large compilers, such as telephone monopolies, is enormous.
Because original compilers who enjoy protected status would
be unlikely to easily grant licenses to secondary compilers,
compelling such licensing would often be settled through long
and costly civil litigation.
Finally, the second tier of protection under the Proposed
Directive is anticompetitive because it is not reciprocal. 90
Non-EU database developers (principally American) will not be
allowed to use the data developed by European developers pro-
tected by the directive. Moreover, American developers will
face competition from European competitors operating in the
United States under the provisions of Feist, which provides
that data is free to all subsequent compilers. It remains an
open question whether a European developer would be allowed
to take the data of a non-EU developer and then gain an own-
ership interest in the copied data. Such a development could be
highly injurious to both the marketplace and worldwide data-
base suppliers because regardless of where databases are de-
veloped, many will be competing for the same global custom-
ers. Unfortunately, these unequal conditions will endure until
bilateral agreements are worked out between the United
States and the EU member states. 9'
188. Ginsburg, supra note 181, at 1926.
189. Id.
190. Proposed Directive, supra note 1, § 5.1.3, at 31
191. This is not likely to happen quickly. Negotiations over intellectual property
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Consequently, the European Union's sui generis protection
of facts in a database is an anticompetitive and inefficient
economic policy choice at this stage of the database develop-
ment process. It is anticompetitive because it grants European
database developers a property interest not enjoyed by their
American counterparts. It is inefficient because it forces trans-
action costs on secondary compilers who must negotiate licens-
ing terms with the original compiler. The prices demanded for
the data will not always be based on the data's value on the
market, but rather on a range of interests including the desire
to maintain high profits and margins by excluding competitors
from certain markets.
C. Preparing the Database for Market
Once data has been secured, either through original collec-
tion, licensing or the simple taking of unprotected data, de-
pending on the legal scheme, the contents must be edited and
refined for use in the new database and then blended into a
presentation format. The goal is to organize and deliver the
information in a way that enables the intended user to access
needed information efficiently. Furthermore, most commercial-
ly significant databases are to some degree dynamic, requiring
updating and revision either consistently or periodically.
192
Here, the economic effects of the two regimes will be most
apparent to end users. Under the United States system, the
cost of the database, and its resulting competitive advantage
will be concentrated in producing an innovative product. Be-
cause the only legally sustainable competitive advantage
available under the United States system will be its creative
selection and arrangement, this stage of the product cycle will
be fertile ground for investment. Users will benefit as produc-
ers are forced to compete by creating more user-friendly sys-
tems, formatting databases more cogently, and by creating
hardware and software tools that enhance the ability of users
to gather and synthesize unrelated data.
The cost of a database under the European scheme, on the
other hand, will be reflected in the cost of gaining access to
protection have been some of the most contentious of the Uruguay round of the
GATT. See Policing Thoughts, supra note 13.
192. Amicus Brief, supra note 14, at 19.
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proprietary data. Because the original compiler owns the un-
derlying data, the price charged for it will be a premium based
on the lack of alternative sellers. For the potentially long peri-
od of time it will take competitors to either negotiate a licens-
ing agreement or develop the data from scratch, the original
compiler will have limited incentive to invest in more effective
and easier-to-use products.
Clearly, the collection and assembly of information as well
as the selection, coordination or arrangement of data are often
extremely time consuming and expensive. The successful devel-
opment and distribution of a database often depends on the
solution of complex marketing problems. The process also calls
for sophisticated knowledge of information science, the study of
information seeking behavior, and of the details of storage and
retrieval systems and computer programs. If the resulting
compilation seems simple to the user, it is precisely because of
the complex web of authorial activity that went into its design
and execution.
In short, United States law recognizes that these complex
factors are at the root of the competitive advantage of a compi-
lation. The United States system rewards these important
investments through the copyright protection of creativity. The
European Union's Proposed Directive, on the other hand, will
draw investment away from these strategic competitive fea-
tures as EU developers struggle to compete at the less de-
manding stage of the original compilation of data.
V. CONCLUSION
The best argument for the United States copyright regime
is that it most closely approximates a free market for data
compilations with commodity data as the central feature. The
price of a database will be set by its development cost and how
well it has been designed through the various stages of the
product development lifecycle. In contrast, the European
scheme allows and sustains monopolies based on the original
compilation of data. This scheme will allow original compilers
to set monopoly prices limited only by inefficient compulsory
licensing schemes.
The European Union's effort to protect domestic competi-
tors now will be harmful to the market for databases in the
short term and to the Europeans themselves in the long term.
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In the short term, because data will be purchased or developed
from scratch each time, the large number of works produced by
EU developers will be expensive. In the long term, the Europe-
ans will ultimately suffer as non-EU competitors accustomed to
competing for global customers based on the quality of their
product will become more and more difficult to beat in the
marketplace. These competitors, hardened by the market and
forced to innovate, will beat the Europeans on every price
performance front. It would be far better for the Europeans to
rely on their ingenuity and face the reality of the market now.
Ultimately, the division between the two regimes repre-
sents a dam over which information will not easily flow. More
than perhaps any other commodity, data must be allowed to
move without barriers in order to allow the world economy to
grow in the most efficient manner possible. Consequently,
rationalization of the two approaches to the copyright protec-
tion of computer databases should be an indispensable part of
negotiations between the United States and the European
Union, both in the multilateral GATT environment and in
more focused bilateral talks.
Charles von Simson
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